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Abstract 
Payments for environmental services (PES) programmes have been widely promoted over the 
last few decades in many developing countries. Improving the livelihoods of environmental 
services (ES) suppliers is not only seen as a side benefit but is often considered a prerequisite 
for the viability of PES. Yet, the ability to draw ‘overview lessons’ over the impacts of PES 
on livelihoods from literature review studies remains limited. To overcome these 
shortcomings, we undertake a meta-analysis of causal statistical studies on the effects of PES 
on the livelihoods of ES suppliers in the developing world. The set-up of our meta-analysis 
allows us to draw more conservative but more reliable and generalisable overview lessons. 
Our findings suggest that PES programmes are likely to have positive but modest livelihood 
impacts on ES suppliers. Further, several institutional characteristics of PES are found to be 
correlated with more favourable livelihood impacts, such as high payments, high degree of 
voluntary participation, low transaction costs and better access to alternative income sources. 
Lastly, our results highlight the importance of controlling for unobservable confounders when 
undertaking original evaluation studies on the impacts of PES. These factors should be 
incorporated in the design, implementation and evaluation of PES. 
 
Keywords: Payments for environmental services programmes, ecosystem services, 
livelihood impact, meta-analysis, policy evaluation methods, conservation. 
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Meta-analysis of livelihood impacts of payments for environmental services 
programmes in developing countries 
 
1   Introduction 
The last decade has witnessed a rapid growth of payments for environmental services (PES) 
programmes in developing countries (Ferraro, Lawlor, Mullan, & Pattanayak, 2012; 
Pattanayak, Wunder, & Ferraro, 2010). Typically PES schemes entail a form of Coasean 
transaction in which environmental service (ES) users make payments to ES providers, in 
exchange for the provision of ES or pre-agreed actions intended to deliver ES (Engel 2016; 
Wunder, 2015).1  In principle a crucial pre-condition for the viability of PES schemes is that 
the benefits accruing to the suppliers of ES should exceed the costs of ES provision (Engel, 
Pagiola, & Wunder, 2008; Pearce, 2004). In other words, the net livelihood impact on 
payment recipients should be positive. This pre-condition is particularly crucial when PES 
schemes are applied in the developing world, as in this context these policies often have the 
dual function of addressing environmental goals and alleviating poverty (Wunder, Engel, & 
Pagiola, 2008). It is, thus, important to assess and understand the magnitude, direction 
(positive or negative) and determinants of livelihood impact of PES polices in the developing 
world.  
Yet, although there is a substantial body of empirical work that aims to assess the impact 
of various PES schemes, our ability to draw robust ‘big-picture’ or ‘generalisable’ lessons 
remains limited. Literature reviews or synthesis papers such as those by Grieg-Gran (2005), 
Jack (2008), Wunder (2008), Pattanayak (2010),  Miteva (2012), Tacconi (2013), Alix-Garcia 
(2014), Engel (2016), Hejnowicz (2014), Samii (2014), Börner (2017), Ma (2017) and their 
co-authors are able to provide a qualitative assessment of the environmental and 
socioeconomic impacts of PES. Though their inferences over actual PES impact are 
informative, they remain very case specific. We are unaware of any robust quantitative 
syntheses of available empirical evidence (such as via meta-analysis) of the livelihood impact 
of PES. What has perhaps hindered this research agenda of deriving more overview lessons is 
that the possible universe of ‘empirical evidence’ is vast and quite heterogeneous. Empirical 
assessments on the impacts of PES studies use different forms of data and analytical methods 
at different levels of scientific rigour. Further, a large proportion of the empirical work on 
evaluating the outcomes of PES has the limitation of not being able to credibly trace the 
causal relationship between a PES and its observed ‘effects’, either on the affected 
communities or the environment (Blackman, 2013; Ferraro et al., 2012; Miteva, Pattanayak, 
& Ferraro, 2012). That is many empirical studies provide purely correlational findings and do 
                                                     
1 This definition confines PES to ‘payments’, so that they can be distinguished from institutional reforms (such 
as bestowing upon individuals or communities the right to benefit from natural resources) and other incentive-
based environmental policy instruments (such as environmental taxes) that are geared towards ES supply. It also 
conceptually separates PES from ecotourism and eco-certification, which were once labelled as ‘indirect PES’ 
(Ferraro & Kiss, 2002). In such situations, the delivery of ES is largely an ancillary benefit, which is not being 
directly traded. This definition also does not include the more general understanding of PES as any policy that 
provides any incentive for the provision of ES (e.g. see Muradian et al 2010, Sommerville et al 2009) 
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not adequately control for confounding factors that could lead to observed impacts and which 
are unrelated to the PES itself (Ferraro and Pattanayak, 2006, Baylis et al 2016). Combining 
empirical results from studies that use such varied methods and data into a meta-analysis 
would lead to results which would be unreliable and of limited informational value.  
This paper addresses these challenges in deriving reliable overview lessons from the 
existing empirical body of work on PES by making two key contributions. First we perform 
perhaps the first meta-analysis of empirical studies that aims to explore the impact of PES 
programmes on the livelihoods of ES suppliers in developing countries. Our analysis adds to 
more qualitative past attempts that have relied mostly on literature reviews. Secondly, we 
include in our analysis only the evidence from ex post impact evaluation studies that use 
statistical methods that explicitly aim to assign a causal link between PES and observed 
outcomes. The quality of any meta-analysis is only as good as its inputs (Glass, 1976) so 
keeping with best practise guidelines we confine our analysis to include studies that entail a 
minimal level of methodological similarity.  
In particular, we use studies that employ impact or programme evaluation methods that 
seek to identify the (treatment) effects of PES on livelihoods whilst controlling for and 
isolating from other confounding factors. These methods include experimental methods 
which control for confounders through randomly assigned treated and control groups, and 
quasi-experimental approaches such as matching, difference-in-differences, instrumental 
variable and regression discontinuity methods (Ferraro & Hanauer, 2014; Greenstone & 
Gayer, 2009; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009; Khandker, Koolwal, & Samad, 2010). The need 
for focusing more on such methods in assessing conservation policies (and PES in particular) 
has been widely and vigorously argued for in recent literature (e.g. Ferraro & Pattanayak, 
2006; Greenstone & Gayer, 2009; Pattanayak et al., 2010; Miteva et al., 2012; Cowling 2014; 
Baylis et al., 2016; Börner et al., 2017; Sills et al., 2017). Admittedly, impact evaluation 
methods are not without flaws nor are they the only scientifically credible approaches for 
assessing policies. Yet, for the purposes of undertaking a valid meta-analysis it is imperative 
to include studies that share a minimal common methodological ground. This reduces both 
the subjectivity in selecting the included studies but also the ‘noise’ in the raw data to be used. 
This rationale conforms with the ‘best evidence synthesis’ approach, as advocated by the 
seminal publications on meta-analysis by Hunter, Schmidt and Jackson (1982) and Slavin 
(1986) but also by best practise guidelines within economics (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012; 
Nelson & Kennedy, 2009). In the present meta-analysis, we focus on empirical studies that 
are explicitly geared towards addressing the issue of attribution via statistical methods. In 
doing so, we are better positioned to draw more reliable inferences about the causal 
relationships between PES programmes and key outcome variables. Our approach aims to 
maximise the possibility of producing clear and credible (albeit more conservative) overview 
lessons from the existing body of empirical work.  
The quantitative nature of our study and the focus on causal statistical evidence distinguish 
it from other qualitative syntheses and literature reviews. Although the studies of Oltmer 
(2000), Brouwer (2011), Ezzine-de-Blas (2016) and their co-authors provide rare examples of 
quantitative syntheses assessing PES programmes, they do not focus on livelihood impacts 
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nor do they limit their analysis to causal statistical studies. As such, the present study is able 
to draw more conservative but perhaps more reliable and more generalisable overview 
lessons on the likely impact of PES on livelihoods. Our analysis provides evidence on how to 
design and implement such programmes so as to enhance the livelihood impact and the long 
term viability of PES programmes. Further, our results shed light on the influences of 
different (causal) evaluation methods on the measurement of livelihood impact which provide 
lessons to those working on policy assessment of PES. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out our main hypotheses based on stylised 
facts on the livelihood impact of PES programmes as derived from past empirical studies and 
literature reviews. Section 3 describes our data used in the meta-analysis and Section 4 
discusses our empirical strategy. The results are presented in Section 5, and the paper 
concludes in Section 6. 
2   Assessing livelihood impact of PES programmes 
Based on the aforementioned literature and qualitative reviews of past experiences with PES, 
we discern four main hypotheses with respect to livelihood impacts of PES on ES suppliers. 
These hypotheses stipulate a priori positive impacts of PES on livelihoods. Moreover, we 
identify additional PES attributes that could impact livelihoods but for which the direction 
and magnitude are more ambiguous a priori. Lastly, we explore in the meta-analysis the 
significance of specific features of the primary impact evaluation studies.  
2.1   Positive PES impacts on livelihoods 
PES programmes are usually assumed to benefit ES suppliers because the received definition 
of PES suggests that – provided the scheme is voluntary – the agreed payments should be 
higher than the opportunity costs of ES suppliers and lower than the willingness to pay (WTP) 
of ES users (Engel et al., 2008, Engel, 2014). In practice, it appears that the payments tend to 
be closer to the opportunity costs of ES suppliers, or the minimum willingness to accept 
(WTA) (Engel 2016, Pagiola, Arcenas, & Platais, 2005), and the gains from supplying ES, if 
any, may likely be insignificant. The possible reasons for this are twofold. First, it is believed 
that ES users tend to be in a better negotiating position because they are often relatively fewer 
in number and better-informed (Wunder, 2008). Secondly, the opportunity costs of ES 
suppliers are relatively easier to estimate, at least on average, compared with the WTP of ES 
users (Pagiola et al., 2005). Moreover, the benefits of ES suppliers may be diluted or even 
overturned by general equilibrium effects. For instance, a PES programme intended to deliver 
ES through agricultural land retirement may reduce local food supply and raise food prices, 
which would adversely affect the well-being of ES suppliers (Zilberman, Lipper, & Mccarthy, 
2008). Yet, even if we observe non trivial livelihoods improvements of ES suppliers in 
developing countries, it remains an open empirical question whether these reflect other 
confounding influences or if they can be attributed to the PES payments per se. Since our 
meta-analysis focuses on studies that have tried to address the issue of attribution, we will 
attempt to provide a more reliable assessment of this fundamental question, namely:  
Hypothesis 1: PES programmes have positive livelihood impacts on ES suppliers.  
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In most cases, direct payments themselves provide the main mechanism by which PES 
programmes are to influence the livelihoods of ES suppliers. It is, thus, to be expected that 
higher payments (either in cash or in kind) would make ES suppliers better off (Pagiola et al., 
2005). However, such additional benefits could be compromised if higher payment rates 
decrease the demand for ES (Ferraro, 2008). Further, there is considerable theoretical work 
suggesting that transfers schemes to farmers (such as agri-environment and agro-forestry 
payments) have general equilibrium effects (affecting prices of factors and commodities) in 
situations where economies are imperfectly integrated in regional economies (e.g. Angelsen 
et al. 2001). In such setting the expected correlation between higher payment rates and more 
favourable livelihood impact needs to be empirically substantiated.  We, thus, explore 
through our meta-analysis whether the existing available empirical evidence from impact 
evaluation studies support the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 2: PES programmes have positive livelihood impacts on ES suppliers if the 
programmes have higher payments. 
 
Further, it would be reasonable to expect that as long as rational ES suppliers voluntarily 
join PES programmes, they cannot be worse-off (Grieg-Gran et al., 2005; Pagiola et al., 2005; 
Wunder, 2008). In other words, voluntary participation can be regarded as a proxy indicating 
that benefits outweigh opportunity costs for ES suppliers. Yet, the development economics 
literature suggests that households (due to institutional failure reasons) often voluntarily 
choose sub-optimal equilibria with respect to land use, labour supply, consumption, savings 
and investment behaviour (e.g. Banerjee and Newman, 1994; De Janvry and Sadoulet, 2006). 
Sometimes ES suppliers who opted to participate at their own will were in effect making a 
sub-optimal decision that adversely affects their livelihoods. This is likely because they did 
not fully account for the costs and benefits of participation due to, (1) being given false 
and/or incomplete information about the terms of the programme, (2) lack of information 
over their true opportunity costs of enrolment, and (3) unforeseen changes in the costs and 
benefits over time (Wunder, 2008). Hence, the voluntary nature of a PES scheme does not 
necessarily suffice to infer positive livelihood impact.  Our meta-analysis will thus aim to 
infer if empirical evidence lends support to the hypothesis: 
    Hypothesis 3: PES programmes have positive livelihood impacts on ES suppliers if their 
participation is made on a more voluntary basis. 
 
Moreover, transaction costs have long been deemed a major threat to the viability and 
efficacy of PES (Pearce, 2004). The Coase Theorem suggests that sufficiently low transaction 
costs constitute a precondition for PES to function at all. In light of that, the presence of 
substantial transaction costs would deplete the payments available to ES suppliers and hence 
lower their gains. For example, in the N’hambita PES programme for carbon sequestration 
(Mozambique), about one third of the carbon revenues are exhausted by local transaction 
costs, and another third are paid to international brokers and commission agents who help to 
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sell the carbon offsets (Jindal, 2012). Similarly, a Cambodian PES programme for bird nest 
protection spends 20-30% of its budget on monitoring (Clements, et al., 2013). Worse still, 
groups that are more likely to benefit from ES provision (due to lower opportunity costs) are 
often subject to higher transaction costs, as they are typically small landholders living in 
remote regions (Pagiola et al, 2005; Wunder, 2008). These theoretical insights and practical 
experiences are suggestive of limited livelihood benefits to ES suppliers in situations where 
transaction costs associated with the PES are nontrivial. Our study attempts to provide an 
overview assessment of what current best available empirical evidence has to say about the 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: PES programmes have positive livelihood impacts on ES suppliers in the 
absence of significant transaction costs.2  
 
2.2   Other PES attributes affecting livelihoods 
Beyond these hypotheses on the positive impacts of PES on livelihoods, the literature 
suggests additional PES attributes that could also have implications for the livelihoods of ES 
suppliers. However, there is more ambiguity as to the direction of the influences of these 
factors.  
To start with, there could be either positive or negative influences on livelihoods if a PES 
programme is financed and executed by the government, compared with non-governmental 
bodies and individuals. On the upside, government-financed programmes are more likely to 
have built-in additional livelihood improvement objectives (Wunder et al., 2008). That said, 
governments often have more bargaining power in the negotiation process. Budget 
considerations may tempt them to set the payment rate below the equilibrium price of the ES 
market, or even lower than the opportunity costs of ES suppliers (in cases where we don’t 
have entirely voluntary participation).  
Moreover, beyond direct payments, many PES programmes provide additional income 
sources to ES suppliers which were previously unavailable. For example, farmers receiving 
direct payments for afforestation may also be allowed (as part of the PES agreement) to sell 
specific types and quantities of non-timber forest products extracted from the conserved areas. 
Alternative income sources could not only influence the livelihoods of ES suppliers during 
the programme period, but also affect the sustainability of ES provision and livelihood 
improvement after the payments expire (Grosjean & Kontoleon, 2009). On the other hand, in 
some PES programmes, alternative income sources are coupled with less attractive payment 
provisions. For instance, during the first stage of the Sloping Land Conversion Programme 
(SLCP) in China, ES suppliers were paid less if they agreed to convert enrolled cropland 
plots to ‘economic forests’, compared with those who were not granted such rights (Xu, Yin, 
Li, & Liu, 2006). Economic forest entailed planting fruit trees, in which case people enrolled 
in the SLCP were allowed to harvest forest products as an alternative income source. Our 
                                                     
2 When testing this hypothesis, we consider a PES programme to be subject to ‘significant transaction costs’ if 
over 10% of the total budget is explicitly spent on administrative affairs such as coordinating ES users and 
suppliers, arranging contracts, making payments and monitoring.  
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analysis explores the overall livelihood impacts of PES programme if the contract provided to 
the ES suppliers the possibility of exploiting  alternative income sources. 
Furthermore, previous literature has discussed the implications on livelihoods if the PES 
payments are partly or mostly invested in communal infrastructure development. Such 
infrastructure development may tend to benefit ES suppliers indirectly and in the long term, 
but is likely to be delivered at the cost of deductions of immediate cash (and in-kind) 
payments. Our meta-analysis explores whether current empirical studies can shed light on the 
net effect on livelihoods when such non-income related benefits are built into the PES 
contract.  
Lastly, if a longer time period has passed since the commencement of a PES programme, it 
is possible that an impact evaluation study may find more favourable livelihood impacts. 
More payments could be transferred to ES suppliers during a longer implementation period, 
which are likely to cover the initial investments required for ES provision and accumulate 
into the net benefits of ES suppliers. Moreover, certain extra benefits would only occur when 
the programme has been running for several years. For instance, the reforestation contracts in 
the Costa Rican national PES programme allow the participants to log trees after an initial 
time period (Pagiola, 2008). Another example is the benefits from favourable institutional 
changes triggered by some PES programmes such as relaxing the constraints on land tenure 
security and liquidity (Arriagada, Sills, Ferraro, & Pattanayak, 2015; Uchida, Rozelle, & Xu, 
2009; Wunder, 2008). On the other hand, it is also possible that the benefits of ES suppliers 
would fade out in the course of time if the payments are devalued by inflation or if the 
contracts terminate, in which case the former ES suppliers might revert back to their old 
(often sub-optimal) production decisions. Moreover, in some other cases, PES-like 
programmes were suspected to have adverse effects on institutions in the long run, such as 
incentivising recentralisation of forest rights (Phelps, Webb, & Agrawal, 2010) or tightening 
liquidity constraints (Jayachandran, 2013). 
 
2.3   Features of primary impact evaluation studies 
Aside from these features of PES per se, estimates of their livelihood outcomes could also be 
influenced by features of the primary empirical impact evaluation studies themselves. We 
now turn to discuss these features.    
First, estimates of the livelihood impact from field and quasi-experimental studies could be 
biased if they are measured without controlling for observable and unobservable confounders, 
or if they were derived from studies that do not use baseline data. It is possible that the 
treated and control groups used in the study are not randomly assigned, and there are some 
systematically different characteristics of the two groups that could influence the treatment 
outcomes. Hence, if these confounders are not controlled for, the estimates of the outcomes 
could be biased (Ferraro & Pattanayak, 2006; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). Similarly, some 
of the baseline characteristics of the treated and control groups before the treatment could 
also influence the treatment outcomes. These initial characteristics can be controlled for if 
baseline data is available. We, thus, control in our meta-regressions for whether 
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observable/unobservable confounders are included, and whether baseline data are gathered 
and used in the primary data studies. 
Moreover, our meta-analysis examines whether the estimates of the livelihood impact is 
influenced by whether non-income indicators (such as consumption expenditure, value of 
durables and assets) are used in the primary impact evaluation studies. Ample literature 
suggests that it should be useful to include non-income indicators to measure welfare impacts, 
since income is difficult to be measured accurately in less-developed regions due to complex 
production patterns and self-employment, while also the linkage between income and welfare 
is not always clear (Haughton & Khandker, 2009). 
Last but not least, the publication status of the primary evaluation studies could be 
correlated with the estimates of livelihood impacts (Card, 2012). For instance, it is possible 
that positive evaluation results are more likely to be published. Our study has sampled both 
published and unpublished evaluation studies to control for potential publication bias. 
3   Data Description 
3.1   Selection of primary impact evaluation studies 
As noted in the introduction, the studies we include in our analysis have all utilised sound 
econometric methods that explicitly aim to address (to varying degrees) the issue of 
attribution (i.e. how can we directly trace livelihood impacts back to PES incentives). These 
studies can be distinguished from correlational ones as well as others that use more 
descriptive and qualitative methods (e.g. structured interviews etc.). Delineating the universe 
of possible studies is amongst the most crucial initial steps of any meta-analysis. The balance 
that meta-analysts should reach is between statistical power on the one hand and introducing 
noise or measurement error in the dependent variable on the other. One could augment the 
possible pool of studies and then include a dummy variable on whether the study adopts a 
sound causal statistical method or not. Yet, the dependent variable that we are interested in 
(namely impact on livelihoods) would be misspecified if it came from studies that do not 
share the minimum methodological common ground of aiming for causal inference. A similar 
logic is followed in meta-analyses conducted in the medical sciences where causal studies are 
not normally included with correlational ones. By focusing on studies that adopt causal 
statistical methods we enhance the likelihood of achieving a ‘best evidence synthesis’. This 
will facilitate a clearer (albeit more conservative) judgment on which assertions found in the 
PES literature can and which cannot be supported by the current body of best available 
empirical evidence. Based on this reasoning, to be included in our meta-analysis, a study 
would have to have 1) conducted an ex post evaluation of the livelihood impact of PES 
programmes on ES suppliers at the household level, 2) employed causal statistical methods as 
described above, and 3) measured the impact on at least one indicator which reflects the 
overall livelihood status such as the total income, total consumption expenditure and/or gross 
value of household assets.  
We compiled studies for the meta-analysis from several different literature sources, 
including academic digital databases and online libraries of relevant governmental and non-
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governmental organisations. We searched for both published and unpublished studies, and 
assessed the inclusion eligibility of both. Only studies written in English were explored. 
Details of the literature sources and searching strategies are listed in Appendix A. Our 
literature search and selection process provided 161 observations from 27 studies on 15 PES 
programmes (see Appendix A). These figures are in line with best practise guidelines and 
published meta-analyses in economics (Stanley and Doucouliagos 2012; Card 2012). The 
vast majority of our studies (23) are based on quasi-experimental methods. There are 19 of 
these studies published in peer-reviewed journals or books. Many of these studies or their 
accompanying research outputs are published in leading academic journals such as Science, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, American Economic Journal: Applied 
Economics, and American Economic Journal: Economic Policy. Nearly all these studies are 
published or written after 2010 (with only three exceptions). This tendency in the data 
confirms that the interest in causal statistical evaluations of PES is part of a relatively more 
recent but growing research agenda. In fact, this recent rise in the number of empirical impact 
evaluation studies on PES from the developing world is what enabled us to undertake a 
reliable meta-analysis in the first place.  
The sampled studies involve major PES programmes in developing countries in Asia, 
Africa and the Americas (as in Figure 1). The geographic focus is dominated by Asia (15 
studies), and there is an absence of evidence from Oceania. Review studies on other 
conservation programmes have found similar geographic distributions of study sites, such as 
the systematic review on community forest management programmes by Bowler et al. (2010). 
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Figure 1   Geographic locations of the PES programmes in the meta-analysis  
Note:  
1. Each bar uses greyscale colours to represent the proportions of different livelihood impacts reported for 
each PES programme (white segment: significantly negative; dotted segment: insignificantly negative; 
grey segment: insignificantly positive; and black segment: significantly positive).  
2. PES programmes: (1) Mexican Payments for Hydrological Environmental Services (PSAH); (2) Costa 
Rican Payments for Environmental Services (PSA); (3) Brazilian Forest Conservation Grant Fund (BFP); 
(4) Rwandan Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT); (5) Ugandan Trees for Global Benefits (TGB); (6) 
Malawian RCT; (7) Tanzanian Equitable Payments for Watershed Services (EPWS); (8) N’hambita 
(Mozambique) PES; (9) Ugandan RCT; (10) Cambodian Bird Nest Protection Programme (BNPP); (11) 
Chinese Sloping Land Conversion Programme (SLCP); (12) Vietnamese Payments for Forest 
Environmental Services (PFES); (13) Vietnamese RCT; (14) Lombok (Indonesia) PES; (15) Chinese 
Paddy Land-to-Dry Land (PLDL).  
 
As it is often the case with meta-analyses in the social sciences, our data included cases 
where multiple observations were derived from the same study. A survey of 140 meta-
analysis studies reveals that on average 6.9 observations are used per primary study (Nelson 
& Kennedy, 2009). Hence, our analysis (that uses 6 observations per primary study on 
average) is in accord with current common practice.  
 
3.2   Data Extraction 
The livelihood impacts of the PES programmes measured by the primary studies (or the 
‘effect sizes’), were coded to form a categorical dependent variable (y), reflecting significant 
negative impact (y = 0), insignificant negative impact (y = 1), insignificant positive impact (y 
= 2) and significant positive impact (y = 3). The wording ‘significant’ suggests that an 
estimate of the livelihood impact (no matter positive or negative) is statistically different 
from zero, and ‘insignificant’ otherwise. Such coding of the dependent variable was 
necessary given that different livelihood indicators were used across the primary studies or 
because similar indicators were not measured in the same way. The potential influencing 
factors of the effect sizes, or the ‘moderators’, include the characteristics of PES programmes 
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and evaluation methods discussed above. The original studies and supplementary sources (as 
described below) provided straightforward and unambiguous information for us to calculate 
or code these moderators without requiring any arbitrary interpretations. Appendix B 
summarises the coding methods and descriptive statistics of these moderators. 
    The vast majority of the required information was derived from the 27 impact evaluation 
studies. Upon the occurrence of missing values, we would firstly contact the authors of these 
papers for such information. In case the authors were unreachable, we would impute the 
missing information according to alternative sources. Further details are documented in 
Appendix B.   
4   Estimation Methods 
The first hypothesis examines the central objective of most meta-analyses – to explore the 
main ‘effect sizes’ of interest (Card, 2012) – and which in this study refers to the typical 
reported livelihood impact of PES on ES suppliers in developing countries. The typical 
‘effect size’ is firstly assessed by the mode and mean values of the 161 estimates of effect 
sizes taken from the sampled primary studies. However, as discussed before, we derived 
multiple observations from one single primary study or PES case. Placing equal weight on 
each of the 161 data points may likely bias our results towards those studies or PES cases 
reporting many results. Following best practice guidelines (Nelson & Kennedy, 2009) we 
checked the robustness of our results by using the mode (or mean) of each study (rather than 
all its estimates) to explore the typical ‘effect size’. We then repeated this procedure at the 
PES programme level.   
In order to test Hypotheses 2–4, a series of meta-regression models were estimated to 
examine the relationship between the effect sizes and the variables of interest (the moderators 
summarised in Appendix B). The dependent variable is coded as ordinal categorical variables 
taking on the four ordinal levels of effect sizes. Model 1 in Table 2 was estimated as an 
ordinal logit model using unweighted data. As noted above, this model is likely to overweight 
those studies or PES programmes that contribute more data to our meta-analysis. We 
accounted for this issue by weighting our data using the inverse of the number of 
observations derived from the same primary study or PES programme (Nelson & Kennedy, 
2009), so that each study or each PES programme would carry equal weight. Models 2 and 3 
in Table 2 were estimated on the weighted data. A positive coefficient in these ordinal models 
suggests that increasing the corresponding variable would – ceteris paribus – enhance the 
probabilities of observing more favourable livelihood outcomes. More formally, an 
explanatory variable’s coefficient captures its effect on the likelihood of a ‘higher rated 
livelihood outcome’, which is measured in log odds: 𝑙𝑛
𝑃𝑟(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
1−𝑃𝑟(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
. In 
our dataset, a ‘higher rated livelihood outcome’ can refer to any one of the three situations: (1) 
a significant positive impact (y = 3), (2) a positive impact (y = 3 or 2), or (3) a positive impact 
or an insignificant negative impact (y = 3, 2 or 1). The statistical validity of the ordinal logit 
model requires the parallel regression assumption that in all three situations a moderator’s 
effect on the log odds of this ‘higher rated livelihood outcome’ is the same (Greene & 
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Hensher, 2010; Long & Freese, 2014). As this restrictive assumption complicates the 
interpretation of the regression results, we sought to relax it and facilitate better 
understanding of the meta-regression findings by formally recoding the effect sizes into a 
binary dependent variable where by y = 1 for significant positive livelihood impacts, and y = 
0 otherwise. Models 4–6 in Table 2 are the binary counterparts models of the ordinal ones 
shown in Models 1–3. A coefficient in these binary logit models indicates a moderator’s 
influence on the probabilities of significant livelihood improvements for ES suppliers. Such 
results are more easily interpretable than those of the ordinal models. All estimation was 
undertaken in Stata.3  
5   Results 
We begin with testing the first hypothesis on the typical livelihood impact of PES. The bar 
charts in Figure 1 visualise the proportions of different livelihood impacts reported for each 
PES programme. A visual examination would reveal that positive but statistically 
insignificant livelihood impacts (represented by grey segments) are typical or dominating. 
This observation is confirmed by formal statistical evidence displayed in Table 1. The first 
column of results in Panel 1 shows that if we allow for multiple observations drawn from 
each primary study (or PES programme) and treat them equally, insignificant positive 
livelihood impacts (y = 2) are most frequently observed, followed by significant positive 
impacts (y = 3). This tendency becomes even more evident in the next two columns of results, 
which are derived from study-level (or PES-level) mode values so as to eliminate the 
disproportionate weights carried by studies (or PES programmes) that report a large number 
of results. Following the same structure, Panel 2 contains the mean effect sizes respectively at 
the estimate, study and PES levels. We find that we cannot reject the hypothesis that average 
y = 2 but equally we can reject that y = 0 or 1 or 3. These results indicate that taken together 
the empirical evidence suggests that PES programmes tend to achieve positive but mostly 
insignificant livelihoods improvements. This finding remains stable upon dropping 
observations on involuntary ES suppliers (as in Table C1 in Appendix C). These results taken 
together provide some albeit weak evidence in favour of Hypothesis 1. This finding is 
consistent with the logic of PES that the payment should at least cover the cost of ES 
provision, or in other words, voluntary participants should not be worse off. 
 
  
                                                     
3 In order to test the robustness of our findings to alternative definitions of the binary dependent variable, we 
constructed this variable in a different way, namely y = 1 for positive livelihood impacts, and 0 otherwise, and 
estimated Models C1–C3. Further, PES programmes in theory should entail full voluntary participation of ES 
suppliers (Engel, 2016; Wunder, 2015). Yet, in reality the degree of voluntariness varies and often cannot be 
fully observed. For example, in China’s SLCP the degree and extent of voluntary participation remains an 
indiscernible and contentious issue (Groom & Palmer, 2012; Wunder et al., 2008). Completely excluding these 
studies would entail a significant informational cost, as their samples do at least partly consist of voluntary 
participants. Despite that, we formally assessed the influence of using such ‘mixed’ data by repeating all our 
analyses after dropping these studies. These results are reported in Appendix C.    
13 
 
Table 1   Livelihood impacts of PES programmes 
 Unit of analysis 
 Estimate Study PES  
Livelihood impact    
Panel 1: Mode    
Number (percentage) of significant negative  
     estimates: y = 0 
3 (2%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Number (percentage) of insignificant negative  
     estimates: y = 1 
32 (20%) 4 (13%) 3 (18%) 
Number (percentage) of insignificant positive  
     estimates: y = 2 
77 (48%) 15 (50%) 10 (59%) 
Number (percentage) of significant positive  
     estimates: y = 3 
49 (30%) 11 (37%) 4 (23%) 
Total number (sample size) 161 (100%) 30 (100%) 17 (100%) 
Panel 2: Mean    
Mean [standard deviation] 2.07 [0.76] 2.13 [0.57] 2.07 [0.52] 
Sample size 161 27 15 
p-value from t-test: mean = 0  
     (significant negative impact) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value from t-test: mean = 1  
     (insignificant negative impact) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value from t-test: mean = 2  
     (insignificant positive impact) 
0.26 0.25 0.63 
p-value from t-test: mean = 3  
     (significant positive impact) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: In Panel 1, for the study level analysis (the second column of results), the total number of studies (30) 
exceeds 27 because the evaluation results of a few studies have multiple mode values. The same holds for 
the PES level analysis (the third column of results).  
 
We next turn to the meta-regression coefficient results presented in Table 2. We examine 
if coefficient estimates for the same explanatory variables across different models remain 
stable (i.e. retain the same sign and roughly similar significance levels). The positive 
coefficient of ‘payment’ provides corroborating evidence for Hypothesis 2 that PES 
programmes have more favourable livelihood impacts on ES suppliers if the programmes 
have higher cash and in-kind payments. This result is statistically significant in most of the 
models in Table 2, except in Models 3 and 6 where we assign less weight to data obtained 
from the same PES programme but from different studies (using the inverse of the total 
number of observations on the same PES programme). In fact, a PES programme may offer 
different types of contracts that entail different payment rates and/or durations, such as the 
N’hambita PES (Mozambique), the PSA (Costa Rica) and the SLCP (China). Many studies in 
our dataset intentionally assessed and compared the outcomes of different contract types (e.g. 
Jindal et al., 2012; Liu and Henningsen, 2016; Morse, 2007). These data, despite being 
derived from the same PES, bring in additional information about how livelihood impacts 
change in response to different payment rates. Weighting them less in the meta-regressions 
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has likely weakened our statistical power to detect the nexus between payment levels and 
livelihood impacts. We hence take the results from the models estimated with this particular 
weighting of the data with more caution.  
Recall that a coefficient’s magnitude translates into changes in the log odds of a more 
favourable livelihood effect, which applies to both ordinal and binary logit models. Therefore, 
the coefficient of ‘payment’ in Model 1 indicates that if the variable is increased by one unit, 
the log odds of a higher rated livelihood outcome would be increased by 1.04.4 We can 
interpret our binary models in the same manner, except that in these models the ‘higher rated 
livelihood outcome’ specifically refers to significant livelihood benefits.  
    Hypothesis 3 stipulates that ES suppliers would be better off in case of higher degree of 
voluntary participation. Our meta-regression results lend strong support to this hypothesis, as 
reflected by the positive and statistically significant coefficient of the variable ‘voluntary 
participation’ throughout all models. The magnitude of such effect further justifies this 
hypothesis, which is greater than that of ‘payment’ in every model. We formally explored the 
relative effects of the two moderators using the predicted probabilities of different livelihood 
impacts given by Model 1 (in which the coefficients of the two moderators are closest to each 
other). Several interesting findings emerge. For example, it is found that a fully voluntary 
programme would be more likely (y = 3 with probability = 53%) to deliver significant 
livelihood benefits compared to a semi-voluntary programme that doubles the payment 
premium (y = 3 with probability = 41%).5 Further, the highest average predicted probability 
for the dependent variable, y, acquiring one of the four assigned values (0, 1, 2, 3), is found 
when y = 2 (with probability of 51%). This is followed by the probability of y = 3 with 
probability of 43%.6 
We further noted above that the typical livelihood impacts tend to be positive but 
insignificant even after dropping all PES cases where participation is suspected to be – partly 
at least – involuntary. Lastly, as previously mentioned, it has been suspected that voluntary 
participation does not always represent optimised decisions, on account of general 
equilibrium effects (Zilberman et al., 2008) and institutional uncertainties in the developing 
world (Wunder, 2008). Our meta-analysis of the currently available causal statistical 
evidence leans towards supporting these viewpoints.  
  
                                                     
4 More formally: 𝑙𝑛
𝑃𝑟(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
1−𝑃𝑟(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
|
𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡+1
=
𝑙𝑛
𝑃𝑟(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
1−𝑃𝑟(𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑟 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑙𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)
|
𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
+ 1.04  
 
5 That is, we find that [𝑃?̂?(𝑦 = 3|𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 0.5, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1) = 0.53] > 
[𝑃?̂?(𝑦 = 3|𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 1, 𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 0.5) = 0.41].  
 
6This is calculated by using Model 1 and keeping all other variables at mean levels. That is: 
 𝑃?̂?(𝑦 = 2|𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1) = 0.51 and  𝑃?̂?(𝑦𝑑 = 3|𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑦 𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 1) = 0.4.  
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Table 2   Meta-regression results 
Dependent variable:  
     Livelihood impact of PES 
Explanatory variables: 
Model 1  
Ordinal 
Model 2  
Ordinal,  
weighted 
Model 3  
Ordinal,  
weighted 
Model 4  
Binary 
Model 5  
Binary,  
weighted 
Model 6  
Binary,  
weighted 
Payment 1.04** 0.99** 0.94 1.16** 1.17** 0.63 
 [0.43] [0.40] [0.69] [0.51] [0.54] [0.78] 
Voluntary participation 1.95*** 1.98*** 3.68*** 3.35*** 3.53*** 4.92*** 
 [0.70] [0.68] [1.18] [1.22] [1.09] [1.68] 
Transaction costs -4.67*** -3.40*** -6.95*** -3.93*** -2.82** -5.51*** 
 [1.09] [0.95] [1.29] [1.44] [1.31] [1.89] 
Governmental programme -0.79 -0.78 -2.01** -0.68 -0.85 -1.14 
 [0.67] [0.61] [0.96] [1.16] [1.11] [1.25] 
Alternative income sources 2.69*** 1.47* 3.15*** 4.33** 3.00** 2.66** 
 [0.90] [0.85] [1.08] [2.05] [1.26] [1.09] 
Communal infrastructure  -3.05** -2.29* -4.89*** -6.26* -5.56** -12.5* 
     development [1.35] [1.40] [1.63] [3.45] [2.28] [6.48] 
Time span 0.19 0.26** 0.48*** 0.60** 0.62*** 0.72*** 
 [0.14] [0.13] [0.18] [0.25] [0.21] [0.20] 
Communal infrastructure  0.51** 0.46* 0.88*** 0.68 0.66** 2.15 
     development × time span [0.23] [0.25] [0.33] [0.49] [0.33] [1.33] 
Observable confounder  -0.06 0.43 0.59 0.45 1.91 2.63* 
     control [0.65] [0.76] [1.03] [1.45] [1.69] [1.52] 
Unobservable confounder  2.24*** 2.51*** 3.77*** 2.69 2.19 3.04*** 
     control [0.68] [0.90] [0.98] [1.95] [1.57] [1.01] 
Baseline data 0.2 -0.18 -1.04 2.23 2.17 1.29 
 [0.55] [0.58] [0.86] [1.61] [1.61] [1.11] 
Livelihood indicator -0.74 -1.31** -0.71 -3.00 -2.8 -2.62** 
 [0.55] [0.61] [0.79] [1.92] [1.71] [1.29] 
Publication status 1.11** 0.81* 1.18** 1.08 0.97* 2.11* 
 [0.43] [0.42] [0.56] [0.72] [0.55] [1.26] 
Weights  1
𝑁𝑆
  
1
𝑁𝑃
   
1
𝑁𝑆
  
1
𝑁𝑃
  
Model significance (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Obs. 159 159 159 159 159 159 
Pseudo R2 0.18 0.20 0.37 0.36 0.40 0.47 
Note:   
1. Ordinal dependent variable: y = 0 (significant negative livelihood impact), y = 1 (insignificant negative 
livelihood impact), y = 2 (insignificant positive livelihood impact), and y = 3 (significant positive livelihood 
impact). Binary dependent variable: y = 1 (significant positive livelihood impact), and y = 0 (otherwise).  
2. * p-value < 0.10. ** p-value < 0.05. *** p-value < 0.01. Standard errors are in brackets.  
3. NS (NP) represents the total number of data points obtained from the same study (PES programme).   
4. We have omitted constants for brevity.   
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Turning to Hypothesis 4 regarding the implications of transaction costs, we find that the 
estimated coefficients for the variable ‘transaction costs’ are negative, sizeable and highly 
significant. This finding is considerably robust to different model specifications and 
estimation methods. These results, thus, lend support to Hypothesis 4 that PES programmes 
are more likely to arrive at inferior livelihood outcomes if transaction costs exceed 10% of 
the programme budgets. Nevertheless, transaction costs are more of a hurdle that need to be 
overcome than a design feature of PES. Examples of suggested remedies include bundling 
different ES objectives into one scheme and encouraging group applications for participation 
(Engel, 2016; Wunder, 2008). However, there often exist trade-offs between mitigating 
transaction costs and achieving cost-effectiveness, as well as environmental and distributional 
objectives (Börner et al, 2017). For instance, though it is argued that using auctions could 
deliver cost savings by allocating PES contracts to those willing to provide more desirable ES 
at lower prices, they may also add to the administrative complexity and costs in running the 
PES programme. Similarly, conditioning payments on conservation outcomes rather than 
actions would likely enhance the environmental efficacy of PES, but also require rigorous 
and costly monitoring (Hanley, Banerjee, Lennox, & Armsworth, 2012). Prioritising the 
participation of poor ES suppliers perhaps contributes towards poverty alleviation goals, but 
may also incur higher transaction costs (Pagiola et al, 2005). These trade-offs should be 
thoroughly considered and carefully balanced when designing PES contracts as our empirical 
evidence suggests that transactions costs do in fact adversely impact the livelihood 
implications of PES.  
With respect to other attributes of PES, we find that providing alternative income sources 
helps foster livelihood improvements for ES suppliers. PES programmes often seek to deliver 
ES via avoiding forest conversion (to agriculture) or retiring agricultural lands, such as the 
Costa Rican PSA and the Mexican PSAH programmes. This is in essence paying ES 
suppliers for not utilising a particular natural resource (Ferraro & Kiss, 2002). The ensuing 
surplus labour could then be allocated to other income generating activities. However, it is 
commonly observed that populations living in developing economies heavily depend on 
natural resources for livelihoods, which implies their limited access to alternative livelihood 
sources (Barbier, 2010). A PES programme that provides or facilitates such access would 
thus help realise the potential of labour released by PES and thereby further benefiting ES 
suppliers. Results from our best available synthesis meta-analysis suggest that this reasoning 
is in fact supported by the available empirical evidence: PES programmes that allow for and 
promote alternative income sources positively impact livelihoods.     
The estimates for the variable ‘communal infrastructure development’ are negative and 
considerably large in absolute value. Its interaction with ‘time span’ picks up a positive long 
term effect on the livelihood outcomes, though much smaller in magnitude compared to the 
main effect. This finding suggests that the net benefits of making PES payments either partly 
or mostly in the form of communal infrastructure investments (instead of direct cash/in-kind 
transfers to ES suppliers) may take a sufficiently long time to materialise.  
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Further, we find no clear or stable evidence for the livelihood impacts of other moderators 
specified in Section 2.2. The estimated coefficient of ‘governmental programme’ is 
consistently negative in all our models, but is insignificant in most cases. This finding to 
some extent casts concerns over the livelihood outcomes of governmental PES programmes 
in developing countries, yet the evidence remains tentative. The estimates for ‘time span’ are 
mostly positive and significant, yet we observe swings in their signs and statistical 
significance, especially in Models C1–C3 in Appendix C. Hence, we should be cautious in 
generalising the positive results in Table 2. Moreover, we explored adding interaction terms 
between ‘time span’ and other PES features to the meta-regression models. Only the 
interaction with ‘communal infrastructure development’ was found to yield stable and 
significant estimates.  Hence, based on the current body of robust empirical studies, the jury 
is still out on the impacts of these two important aspects of PES. Further PES evaluation 
studies would be needed before their impacts on livelihoods assertions are reassessed.  
Lastly, we turn to the meta-regression results regarding the characteristics of the empirical 
strategies and publication status of the sampled evaluation studies. The effects of 
‘unobservable confounder control’ are noteworthy. This dummy variable equals to one if the 
livelihood impact is gauged by those empirical methods more capable of controlling for some 
determinants of the livelihood outcome (other than the PES treatment) which are unidentified 
or difficult to measure. These methods include panel models, instrumental variables and 
randomised controlled trials (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). This finding suggests that in order to 
provide more convincing evidence for the causal relationship between a PES programme and 
the outcomes of interest, it should be helpful to cross-validate the results using these 
empirical strategies that control for unobservable confounders. Further, we find suggestive 
evidence that impact evaluation studies are less optimistic about the livelihood outcomes of 
PES when using non-income livelihood indicators. The estimates for ‘observable confounder 
control’ and ‘baseline data’ yield a less clear picture. Lastly, the coefficient of ‘publication 
status’ is consistently positive and significant in nearly all models, pointing towards a 
preference for publishing positive results of PES over null or negative ones. This finding 
further justifies the necessity of including both published and unpublished evaluation studies 
in our meta-analysis. It also highlights the possible bias on behalf of journals of not 
publishing studies with null or negative results. 
6   Conclusion 
This study conducts perhaps a first meta-analysis on the direction, magnitude and influencing 
factors of the livelihood impacts of PES on ES suppliers in developing countries. The 
analysis consists of 161 data points from 27 studies. These empirical estimates of livelihood 
impacts (i.e. effect sizes) were derived from the existing body of primary studies that 
explicitly adopts causal statistical methods in an attempt to assess the causal link between 
PES and livelihoods (as opposed to simple correlational studies or qualitative methods such 
as structured interviews). This approach for delineating eligible studies allowed us to derive a 
synthesis of the more methodologically cohesive empirical evidence. The hypotheses that 
were tested were derived from often made assertions and stylised facts found in the relevant 
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literature on the likely livelihood impacts of PES and the determinants of these impacts. The 
set-up of our meta-analysis allows us to draw more conservative but more generalisable 
overview lessons on these assertions compared to the conclusions derived on the basis of 
isolated case studies or reviews that use evidence generated through a much wider spectrum 
of methods.  
The estimates of the typical effect size indicate that PES programmes do have a positive 
livelihood impact on ES suppliers, albeit a modest one at the 10% significance level. The 
meta-regression models provide supporting evidence for the hypotheses that PES 
programmes are likely to have more favourable livelihood impacts if they provide higher 
payments (either cash and in-kind), entail higher degrees of voluntary participation, incur 
lower transaction costs and create alternative income sources. Furthermore, we find that 
making PES payments partly/mostly in the form of communal infrastructure investments 
would only benefit ES suppliers in the long term. Our best evidence based meta-analysis does 
not provide robust support for other PES attributes frequently alleged to be influential for the 
livelihood implications for ES suppliers. These attributes include whether a PES programme 
is financed and executed by governmental bodies, and how much time has passed after its 
introduction. Their effects may be present in isolated case studies but the point being made in 
this paper is that we find that the available statistical causal evidence does not allow (at least 
for now) for these assertions to be generalised. Last but not least, our results have also 
identified the necessity of controlling for unobservable confounders to cross-validate the 
estimated treatment effects of PES in impact evaluation studies.  
On the basis of these more evidence based generalisable findings, we can infer useful 
implications for the design, implementation and evaluation of PES. PES are hatched as ‘win-
settle’ programmes which have as a primary aim to provide additional ES whilst ensuring that 
ES suppliers are not made worse off (Wunder, 2013). In spite of that, it is instrumental for the 
delivery of ES to ensure that a PES scheme is beneficial to the livelihoods of ES suppliers. 
The underlying assumption is that additional ES supply nearly always conflicts with certain 
income generating activities and thus cannot be guaranteed if the losses are not fully 
compensated (Engel et al., 2008; Engel 2016; Pearce, 2004). Following this logic, PES 
programmes analysed in this study have (on average) met this prerequisite for additional ES 
provision. This makes us conservatively optimistic about the average environmental efficacy 
of these PES programmes based on the current evidence.7 That said, a nontrivial proportion 
of these PES programmes were found to have caused (significant or insignificant) net losses 
to ES suppliers. Such results provide a cautionary warning that further improvements to 
livelihoods must be incorporated in this subset of PES programmes to secure ES provision. 
Our meta-analysis suggests that the most straightforward means of achieving this is to 
                                                     
7  Of course, this interpretation is largely speculative and relies heavily on the more narrow economic 
understanding of PES programmes. Net gains for ES suppliers do not necessarily secure additional ES provision 
if: (1) ES suppliers are paid for ES that could have been delivered without compensation (no opportunity costs); 
(2) activities afflicting ES supply are displaced to locations that are not bound by PES obligations (leakage 
effects); and/or (3) PES payments weaken (‘crowd out’) non-economic incentives for ES provision such as civic 
virtues, etc. (Muradian et al., 2013; Pattanayak et al., 2010; Vatn, 2010). Ideally future research would 
undertake a meta-analysis of the causal statistical evidence of the environmental outcomes of PES to 
substantiate these conjectures. To date, this is not feasible given the limited number of relevant causal statistical 
studies.  
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increase the payment rate. Yet, more importantly our analysis highlights other PES design 
attributes that are important determinants of livelihood improvements, such as the degree of 
voluntary participation, the level of transaction costs and the availability of alternative 
income sources. Simply handing out cash alone may not suffice to ensure prolonged 
significant benefits for ES suppliers.   
Furthermore, the limited size and significance of the positive livelihood benefits identified 
in the meta-analysis could enhance the risk that these modest gains could be reversed after 
PES payments end, which would put the associated ES that are supplied at stake. Infinitely 
extending payment durations (and contract periods) would be prohibitively difficult, if not 
impossible (Engel, 2016). Nevertheless, it is possible to induce a continuing supply of ES 
beyond the finite time horizon of PES payments. This can be achieved by designing PES 
schemes in a way that they directly address certain institutional and market failures that led to 
the under provision of the ecosystem services in the first place (Grosjean & Kontoleon, 2009). 
For example, property right ambiguities may compel land holders to intensify and/or expand 
cultivation as a means to secure de facto land rights. This practice could adversely affect the 
levels of ecosystem services (by exacerbating loss of topsoil and siltation of source waters) 
and land holders’ livelihoods (by obstructing more profitable alternative income generating 
activities such as pursuing off-farm employments and growing fruit trees). There is a similar 
example concerning liquidity constraints, namely that subsistence farmers cannot afford 
upfront investments in livelihood enhancing activities due to lack of cash flows, and are thus 
locked into sub-optimal production activities that generate less income at a higher cost of 
natural resources. Perhaps PES programmes should specifically include built in components 
intended to address these labour market institutional impediments. This would enhance the 
long-term viability or sustainability of ES provision.  
It is worth noting that our findings are confined to the narrower economic or financial 
dimension of livelihoods. A much wider array of assets and activities jointly contribute to the 
living standards and well-being of ES suppliers (Chambers & Conway, 1992; Hejnowicz et 
al., 2014). As can be seen in Table 1, we find that PES programmes on average have an 
insignificant positive effect on the financial capital of ES suppliers. But this result may not 
proffer unambiguous implications for other livelihood components, such as natural capital, 
social capital and institutional capital. Taking natural capital as the first example, we have 
mentioned that the centrepiece of PES design presumes that net financial benefits would 
incentivise ES provision, which often relates to the enhancement of natural capital. Yet, we 
have discussed that such improvements in natural capital may be undermined by leakage 
effects (Pattanayak, Wunder, & Ferraro, 2010). Considering social capital, whether PES 
payments weaken (‘crowd out’) or strengthen (‘crowd in’) conservation related civic virtues 
and behaviour is largely unpredictable and context dependent (Wunder, 2013). Moreover, we 
have seen inconsistent (and even opposite) effects of different PES cases on institutional 
capital, such as the development of property rights (Arriagada et al., 2015; Liu, Gong, & 
Kontoleon, 2018; Phelps et al., 2010; Wunder, 2008). More attention needs to be drawn to 
empirically assessing the impacts of PES on other facets of livelihoods, in particular, human, 
social and institutional capital (Hejnowicz et al., 2014).  
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Our results and recommendations do not of course provide the final word on the 
performance of PES on livelihoods. Ex post empirical evidence is inherently drawn from past 
experiences and cannot fully account for PES cases that are currently ongoing. Instead, we 
have argued that our approach does provide for a more objective and reliable account of 
which of the assertions made in the literature on the livelihood impacts of PES can and which 
cannot be supported by the current body of causal statistical empirical studies. Meta-analysis 
is an ever evolving exercise that needs to be repeated as more studies become available. 
Nevertheless, periodically taking stock in a systematic way of what current best practice 
evidence can support aids the advancement of science and policy making. The plea made by 
many authors for the urgent need for undertaking more methodologically sound empirical 
studies that evaluate PES (Ferraro and Pattanayak 2006; Miteva et al., 2012) is motivated 
primarily by the acknowledged necessity to increase the body of empirical evidence in order 
to undertake further meta-analyses in the future.   
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Appendix A   Searching Strategies and Inclusion Criteria  
A.1   Searching strategies  
The following sources and searching strategies were used to search for primary evaluation 
studies on the livelihood impacts of PES to construct the sample of the meta-analysis.  
    Firstly, several academic digital databases were searched, including the Web of Science 
(formerly known as the ISI Web of Knowledge), Science Direct and IDEAS. Google search 
engine was also used and the first 200 returns were screened, in order to cover unpublished 
and grey literature including working papers, conference papers and degree dissertations. 
Three categories of key words were used to search those sources. The first category identified 
‘payments’, including: ‘pay*’, ‘compensat*’, ‘incentiv*’, ‘reward*’, ‘award*’, and ‘subsid*’. 
The second category identified ‘environment’, including: ‘ecol*’, ‘ecos*’, ‘environment*’ 
and ‘conservation*’. The third category identified ‘impacts’, including: ‘impact*’, ‘effect*’, 
‘livelihood*’, ‘povert*’, ‘socioeconomic*’ ‘income*’ ‘wel*’. We searched for all possible 
combinations of the three categories of keywords, and used wildcards (*) and fuzzy searching 
wherever possible.  
    Furthermore, the online libraries of some highly-relevant non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) were also searched, including the International Initiative for Impact Evaluation (3ie), 
International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty 
Action Lab (J-PAL), Environment for Development (EfD), Economy and Environment 
Program for Southeast Asia (EEPSEA), and Collaboration of Environmental Evidence.  The 
titles and abstracts of all the research reports from those sources were browsed one by one, 
instead of searching by keywords.  
    Moreover, the online collections of some highly-relevant academic journals were used, 
including the Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, the 
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, the American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics, Environmental and Resource Economics, Land Economics, World Development, 
Ecological Economics, Environment and Development Economics, Environmental 
Conservation, Ecosystem Services and the Journal of Agricultural Economics. The titles and 
abstracts of the papers were browsed one by one. Only the issues from 2000 to present were 
searched because causal empirical literature on PES was rare before that date    After 
accumulating a certain number of studies for potential inclusion in the meta-analysis, 
backward and forward searches were conducted to collect more studies on the topic. 
‘Backward searching’ refers to the process of searching for relevant studies cited by the 
literature that has already been collected. In contrast, ‘forward searching’ aims to find studies 
that cite the literature already collected. The forward searches were conducted using the Web 
of Science database.  
We sent out 19 emails to the corresponding authors of those sampled studies and other 
researchers in the most relevant research area. We received responses from 8 of these 
researchers, which represents a response rate of roughly 42%. Those emails were used to 
27 
 
request for, 1) additional studies on the topic, and 2) supplementary information about those 
studies already sampled. 
 
A.2   Inclusion criteria 
We included only those studies that, 1) conducted ex post evaluations of the livelihood 
impacts of PES on ES suppliers at the household level, 2) employed causal statistical 
methods (such as randomised controlled trials, regressions, matching, difference-in-
difference and fixed effects, instrumental variables and regression discontinuity, etc.), and 3) 
measured the impact on at least one indicator which reflects the overall livelihood status such 
as total income, total consumption expenditure and/or gross value of household assets. Based 
on these criteria, studies such as those of Antle (2008), Cole (2010) and their co-authors were 
not included because their evaluation methods were beyond the scope of this study; studies 
such as those of Robalino (2014), Sims (2017) and their co-authors were not included 
because the impact was not measured at the household level; studies such as those of Bravo-
Ureta (2011), Kwayu (2017) and their co-authors were not included because their livelihood 
indicators were unable to reflect the overall livelihood status of ES suppliers. This left us with 
27 primary evaluation studies, as shown in Table A1.  
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Table A1   Sampled studies 
Literature PES programme Location 
Full sample size 
(households)a 
Livelihood 
indicator 
Evaluation 
method 
Number of 
estimates of the 
livelihood impact 
Most frequently 
reported estimate 
of the livelihood 
impact (number) 
(Alix-Garcia et al. 2012) PSAH Mexico 1242 Asset 
DID, 
Matching 
12 
Insignificantly 
positive (9) 
(Alix-Garcia et al. 2015) PSAH Mexico 1210 Asset 
DID, 
Matching 
6 
Insignificantly 
positive (6) 
(Arriagada et al. 2015) PSA Costa Rica 202 Asset 
DID, 
Matching 
6 
Insignificantly 
negative (6) 
(Clements & Milner-Gulland, 
2015) 
BNPP Cambodia 247 Asset 
DID, 
Matching 
1 
Insignificantly 
negative (1) 
(Diswandi, 2017) Lombok PES Indonesia 200 Asset OLS/IV 1 
Insignificantly 
positive (1) 
(Groom, 2012) SLCP China 286 Income 
DID, 
Matching  
8 
Significantly 
positive (4) 
(Groom & Palmer, 2012) SLCP China 284 Income 
DID, 
Matching 
7 
Significantly 
positive (5) 
(Hegde & Bull, 2011) N’hambita PES Mozambique 290 Income Matching 12 
Insignificantly 
positive (8) 
(Jack & Santos,2017)  RCT Malawi 433 Asset RCT, DID 2 
Insignificantly 
positive (2) 
(Jayachandran et al., 2016) RCT Uganda 1099 Income RCT, DID 3 
Significantly 
positive (2) 
(Jindal et al. , 2012) N’hambita PES Mozambique 190 Income, asset DID 4 
Significantly 
positive (3) 
(Kiyingi et al., 2016) TGB Uganda 638 Consumption 
Matching, 
Switching 
regression 
4 
Insignificantly 
positive (3) 
(Li et al., 2011) SLCP China 1074 Income OLS/IV 11 
Significantly 
positive (9) 
(Liang et al. , 2012) SLCP China 1073 Income OLS/IV 4 
Insignificantly 
negative (2) 
(Lin & Yao, 2014) SLCP China 269 Income SEM 4 
Insignificantly 
positive (4) 
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Literature PES programme Location 
Full sample size 
(households)a 
Livelihood 
indicator 
Evaluation 
method 
Number of 
estimates of the 
livelihood impact 
Most frequently 
reported estimate 
of the livelihood 
impact (number) 
(Liu et al.,  2010) SLCP China 1968 Income FE  panel 6 
Significantly 
positive (6) 
(Liu & Henningsen, 2016) SLCP China 1458 Consumption HT panel 10 
Significantly 
positive (4) 
(Lokina & John, 2016) EPWS Tanzania 200 Asset Matching 1 
Significantly 
positive (1) 
(Ly, 2013) PFES Vietnam 749 Income 
DID, 
Matching 
8 
Insignificantly 
positive (6) 
(Martin et al., 2014) RCT Rwanda  357 Consumption RCT, DID 6 
Insignificantly 
positive (4) 
(Morse, 2007) PSA Costa Rica 208 Income Matching 2 
Insignificantly 
positive (1); 
significantly 
positive (1) 
(Phan et al., 2015) PFES Vietnam 264 Income DID 3 
Significantly 
positive (3) 
(Swartz, 2015) BFP Brazil 214 Income, asset 
Matching, 
OLS 
24 
Insignificantly 
negative (11); 
insignificantly 
positive (11) 
(The & Ngoc, 2006)  RCT Vietnam 136 Income  RCT 1 
Insignificantly 
positive (1) 
(Uchida et al., 2007) SLCP China 339 Income 
DID, 
Matching 
7 
Insignificantly 
positive (5) 
(Xu et al., 2010) SLCP China 345 Income DID 6 
Insignificantly 
positive (5) 
(Zheng et al., 2013) PLDL China 723 Income 
DID,  
Matching 
2 
Insignificantly 
positive (1); 
significantly 
positive (1) 
Notes:  
The full sample size refers to the maximum number of households that were surveyed. Some estimates may be derived from different sub-samples.  
 
Abbreviations:  
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BFP: Bolsa Floresta Programme (Forest Conservation Grant Fund).  
BNPP: Bird Nest Protection Programme. 
DID: Difference-in-Difference.  
EPWS: Equitable Payments for Watershed Services. 
FE: Fixed Effects.  
HT: Hausman-Taylor.  
OLS: Ordinary Least Squares.   
PFES: Payments for Forest Environmental Services.  
PLDL: Paddy Land-to-Dry Land.  
PSA: Pago por Servicios Ambientales (Payments for Environmental Services).  
PSAH: Pago de Servicios Ambientales Hidrológicos (Payments for Hydrological Environmental Services).  
RCT: Randomized Controlled Trial.  
SEM: Simultaneous Equation Model. 
 IV: Instrumental Variables 
SLCP: Sloping Land Conversion Programme. 
TGB: Trees for Global Benefits.  
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Appendix B   Coding Methods and Descriptive Statistics 
The dependent and explanatory variables involved in the meta-regressions were coded into 
metrics according to their definitions as illustrated in Table B1. The vast majority of the 
required information was extracted from the 27 impact evaluation studies. Upon the 
occurrence of missing values, we would firstly contact the authors of these papers for such 
information. In case the authors were unreachable, we would impute the missing information 
according to alternative sources. The imputed information and sources are summarised by 
Table B2.  
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Table B1   Descriptive statistics 
Unit of analysis: Estimate Study PES 
Variable Mean [SD] Mean [SD] Mean [SD] 
Livelihood impact (ordinal) 
= 0 if significant negative, = 1 if insignificant negative, = 2 if insignificant 
positive, and = 3 if significant positive. 
2.07 [0.76] 2.13 [0.57] 2.07 [0.52] 
Payment (continuous) 
The relative difference between PES payments (cash and in-kind) and 
profits of alternative land-use patterns (or production practices).  
0.11 [0.63] 0.15 [0.68] 0.06 [0.60] 
Voluntary participation (binary) 
= 1 if no involuntary participation explicitly documented (= 0 otherwise). 
0.60 [0.49] 0.63 [0.49] 0.87 [0.35] 
Transaction costs (binary) 
= 1 if over 10% of the total budget is explicitly spent on administrative 
affairs such as coordinating ES users and suppliers, arranging contracts, 
making payments and monitoring (= 0 otherwise).  
0.38 [0.49] 0.37 [0.49] 0.53 [0.52] 
Governmental programme (binary) 
= 1 if a PES programme is funded and implemented by the government  
(= 0 otherwise). 
0.63 [0.48] 0.59 [0.50] 0.33 [0.49] 
Alternative income sources (binary) 
= 1 if alternative income sources are made available to more than 50% of 
ES suppliers (= 0 otherwise). 
0.43 [0.50] 0.39 [0.49] 0.49 [0.50] 
Communal infrastructure development (binary) 
= 1 if over 50% of the payments are invested in communal infrastructure 
development (= 0 otherwise). 
0.47 [0.50] 0.39 [0.49] 0.48 [0.51] 
Time span (continuous) 
Years between the commencement and the evaluation of the programme. 
5.24 [2.25] 4.92 [2.29] 4.31 [1.94] 
Observable confounder  control (binary) 
= 1 if the evaluation study controls for observable confounders  
(= 0 otherwise). 
0.91 [0.29] 0.88 [0.28] 0.85 [0.28] 
Unobservable confounder control (binary) 
= 1 if the evaluation study controls for unobservable confounders  
(= 0 otherwise). 
0.79 [0.41] 0.80 [0.39] 0.82 [0.33] 
Baseline data (binary)  
= 1if the evaluation study uses baseline data (= 0 otherwise). 
0.65 [0.48] 0.67 [0.45] 0.67 [0.37] 
Livelihood indicator (binary) 
= 1 if the impact evaluation study uses non-income livelihood indicators  
(= 0 otherwise).  
0.40 [0.49] 0.41 [0.48] 0.57 [0.46] 
Publication status (binary) 
= 1 if the evaluation study has been published as a journal article or a 
monograph (= 0 otherwise). 
0.62 [0.49] 0.70 [0.47] 0.66 [0.45] 
Full sample size 161 27 15 
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Table B2   Imputed information and sources 
Literature Imputed information and sources 
(Alix-Garcia et al.,   
2012) 
Profits of alternative land-use (corn and livestock production): Muñoz-Piña (2008).  
(Alix-Garcia, et al. 
2015) 
Profits of alternative land-use (corn and livestock production): Muñoz-Piña (2008). 
(Arriagada, et al. 
2015) 
Programme payments: Pagiola (2008); profits of alternative land-use (rent as pasture) 
and transaction costs: Porras et al. (2013). 
(Clements & Milner-
Gulland, 2015) 
Programme payments, daily wage and transaction costs: Clements et al. (2013).  
(Diswandi, 2017) Profits of alternative land-use (none): communications with the author.  
(Groom, 2012) Profits of alternative land-use (grain production): China Rural Statistical Yearbook 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2003-2011). 
(Groom & Palmer, 
2012) 
Profits of alternative land-use (grain production): China Rural Statistical Yearbook 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2003-2011). 
(Hegde & Bull, 
2011) 
Programme payments and transaction costs: Jindal et al. (2012). 
(Jack & 
Santos,2017) 
Programme payments and transaction costs: Jack (2013); profits of alternative land-use 
(maize and soya production): Jack (2011).  
(Jayachandran et al., 
2016) 
Profits of alternative land-use (cutting trees and cultivation) and transaction costs: 
Jayachandran et al. (2017).  
(Jindal, Kerr, & 
Carter, 2012) 
Profits of alternative land-use (crop production): Hegde and Bull ( 2011). 
(Kiyingi et al., 2016) Programme payments and alternative land-use (coffee production): Fisher (2011).  
(Li, Feldman, Li, & 
Daily, 2011) 
Programme payments: Xu et al. (2010); profits of alternative land-use (grain 
production): China Rural Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics, 2003-
2011). 
(Liang, Li, Feldman, 
& Daily, 2012) 
Programme payments: Xu et al. (2010); profits of alternative land-use (grain 
production): China Rural Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics, 2003-
2011). 
(Lin & Yao, 2014) Profits of alternative land-use (grain production): China Rural Statistical Yearbook 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2003-2011). 
(Liu, Lu, & Yin, 
2010) 
Profits of alternative land-use (grain production): China Rural Statistical Yearbook 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2003-2011). 
(Morse, 2007) Programme payments: (Pagiola, 2008); profits of alternative land-use (rent as pasture) 
and transaction costs: Porras et al. (2013). 
(Swartz, 2015) Programme payments and profits of alternative land-use (cultivation): Lucas (2013).  
(The & Ngoc, 2006) Livelihood impact: communications with authors.  
Note: No information was imputed for the other studies in our sample.   
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Appendix C   Robustness Checks 
 
Table C1   Robustness checks for the livelihood impact of PES programmes 
 Unit of analysis 
 Estimate Study PES programme 
Livelihood impact    
Panel 1: Mode    
Number (percentage) of significant negative  
     estimates: y = 0 
0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
Number (percentage) of insignificant negative  
     estimates: y = 1 
24 (25%) 3 (15%) 3 (20%) 
Number (percentage) of insignificant positive  
     estimates: y = 2 
53 (55%) 11 (55%) 9 (60%) 
Number (percentage) of significant positive  
     estimates: y = 3 
20 (20%) 6 (30%) 3 (20%) 
Total number (sample size) 97 (100%) 20 (100%) 15 (100%) 
Panel 2: Mean    
Mean [standard deviation] 1.96 [0.68] 2.14 [0.60] 2.09 [0.58] 
Sample size 97 18 14 
p-value from t-test: mean = 0  
     (significant negative impact) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value from t-test: mean = 1  
     (insignificant negative impact) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
p-value from t-test: mean = 2  
     (insignificant positive impact) 
0.55 0.33 0.58 
p-value from t-test: mean = 3  
     (significant positive impact) 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
Note: These robustness checks are based on a subset of our data that drops observations on involuntary ES suppliers. 
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Table C2   Robustness checks for the meta-regression results 
Dependent variable:  
     Livelihood impact of PES 
Explanatory variables: 
Model C1  
Binary 
Model C2  
Binary,  
weighted 
Model C3  
Binary,  
weighted 
Model C4  
Ordinal 
Model C5  
Ordinal,  
weighted 
Model C6  
Ordinal,  
weighted 
Payment 0.28 0.52 1.46* 1.86 1.24 2.04* 
 [0.62] [0.57] [0.80] [1.23] [0.97] [1.25] 
Voluntary participation 2.26** 3.04*** 6.11***    
 [1.14] [1.10] [1.62]    
Transaction costs -5.79*** -5.39*** -8.16*** -11.68*** -10.67*** -13.83*** 
 [1.24] [1.22] [1.59] [3.73] [2.27] [4.08] 
Governmental programme -1.19 -1.36 -0.99 -1.58 -2.24 -2.50* 
 [1.06] [1.00] [1.09] [1.22] [1.44] [1.41] 
Alternative income sources 2.36*** 0.91 4.30** 7.89* 6.16*** 8.56** 
 [0.86] [0.75] [1.78] [4.07] [2.25] [4.15] 
Communal infrastructure  -3.99 -0.65 -2.38 -6.34** -5.70* -7.60*** 
     development [2.45] [3.05] [2.95] [2.88] [3.02] [2.50] 
Time span -0.06 0.19 0.25 0.87*** 1.09*** 1.12*** 
 [0.16] [0.16] [0.19] [0.32] [0.30] [0.38] 
Communal infrastructure  0.97** 0.64 0.75 0.71 0.72 0.94 
     development × time span [0.46] [0.61] [0.84] [0.65] [0.67] [0.61] 
Observable confounder  1.21 1.49 2.73** -0.69 -0.81 -0.60 
     control [1.12] [1.10] [1.34] [1.25] [1.25] [1.33] 
Unobservable confounder  5.83*** 5.85*** 6.10** 4.22*** 4.78** 4.97*** 
     control [2.10] [2.04] [2.92] [1.43] [1.92] [1.58] 
Baseline data -2.87 -3.08 -2.16 -0.30 -1.28 -0.92 
 [2.16] [2.05] [2.31] [1.18] [1.14] [1.44] 
Livelihood indicator -0.73 -2.50** -2.52 -0.29 -1.24 -0.39 
 [0.94] [1.14] [1.55] [0.98] [0.97] [1.12] 
Publication status 1.89** 2.14** 3.98** 1.81** 1.02 2.13* 
 [0.78] [0.95] [1.73] [0.91] [0.68] [1.21] 
Weights  1
𝑁𝑆
  
1
𝑁𝑃
   
1
𝑁𝑆
  
1
𝑁𝑃
  
Model significance (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Obs. 159 159 159 95 95 95 
Pseudo R2 0.31 0.39 0.57 0.40 0.49 0.52 
Note:  
1. Binary dependent variable: y = 0 (negative livelihood impact), and y = 1 (positive livelihood impact). Ordinal 
dependent variable: y = 0 (significant negative livelihood impact), y = 1 (insignificant negative livelihood impact), y = 2 
(insignificant positive livelihood impact), and y = 3 (significant positive livelihood impact).  
2. Models C4–C6 are estimated using a subset of our data that drops observations on involuntary ES suppliers. The 
regressor ‘voluntary participation’ is thus dropped from these models because it has no variation. 
3. * p-value < 0.10. ** p-value < 0.05. *** p-value < 0.01. Standard errors are in brackets. 
4. NS (NP) represents the total number of estimates obtained from the same study (PES programme).    
5. We have omitted constants for brevity. 
